

# **Technology choices in electricity markets: the impact of long term contracts**

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
**LARSEN Workshop on “Efficiency, Competition and Long  
Term Contracts in Electricity Markets”**

**FLORENCE – 15-16 January 2009**

**\*The views in this presentation are based on work done while the author  
was with the EPRG and are those of the author alone.**

# Introduction - Technology choices in Europe

EU 27 capacity additions by vintage



- CCGTs have been new entrants' generation choice in liberalised markets
  - Liberalisation accompanied by trend toward decreasing capital intensity since the 1980s
  - Deployment of low carbon technologies (renewables, nuclear, CC&S) will likely reverse this trend

=> **What are the implications for contractual arrangements and industry structure evolution?**

# Introduction

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- **Power generation technologies have different risk and returns characteristics**
    - Different exposure to market risks (electricity price, fuel price, CO2 price)
    - Different degrees of capital intensity (ratio of investment to operating costs)
    - ⇒ How do long term contracts affect the risks and returns and competitiveness of different technologies?
  - **The vertical and horizontal market positioning of investors and the contractual arrangements affect technology choices**
    - Vertical integration / long term contracts - fuel sourcing and power purchase agreements
    - New entrants' technology choices will likely diver from vertically integrated / portfolio utilities
- ⇒ **Industrial organisation and long term contracts affect technology choices and fuel mix**
- ⇒ **Which industrial structure and contractual arrangements will make possible the financing of capital intensive “green technologies” (nuclear, renewables, CC&S)?**
- ⇒ **What are the implications for competition and antitrust policies?**

# Outline

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Technology choices and investment risks allocation:

1. Vertical integration and/or long term contracts – impact for a new entrant
2. Portfolio diversification for large utilities
3. Optimal contract cover for new entrants / portfolio utilities

# Technology choices with market risks – the case of a new entrant

- Assumption: IPP without significant vertical integration and without pre-existing plant portfolio
- Focus on market risks (power price, fuel prices, CO2 price)

- Focus on 3 technologies: CCGT, Coal, and nuclear


- NPV model parameters based on IEA/NEA (2005) & IEA (2006)

- Monte Carlo simulation of NPV – distributions based on UK historical data (2001-2005)

Parameters	Unit	Nuclear	Coal	CCGT
<b>Technical parameters</b>				
Net capacity	M we	1000	1000	1000
Capacity factor	%	85%	85%	85%
Heat rate	BTU/KWh	10400	8600	7000
Carbon intensity	kg-C/mmBTU	0	25.8	14.5
Construction period	years	5	4	2
Plant life	years	40	40	25
<b>Cost parameters</b>				
Overnight cost	€/Kwe	2000	1120	520
Incremental capital costs	€/Kwe/yr	16	9.6	4.8
Fuel costs	€/mmBTU	0.4	2	5.8
Real fuel escalation	%	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%
Nuclear waste fee	Mill€/KWh	1	0	0
Fixed O&M	€/Kwe/year	52	40	20
O&M real escalation rate	%	0.5%		
<b>Financing parameters</b>				
WACC	%	10%		
<b>Government actions</b>				
Carbon tax	€/tCO <sub>2</sub>	10		
Carbon price escalation	%	1%		
<b>Revenues</b>				
Electricity price	€cents/KWh	5.5		
Electricity escalation rate	%	0.5%		

# Case Nb. 1: Impact of fuel and CO2 price risks – electricity sold at fixed price through long term contract


NPV (€million/GW) probability distribution  
Fuel price risk - fixed electricity price  
(in  $10^{-4}$  for 100 000 simulations)



- CCGT more exposed to fuel (gas) price volatility than coal or nuclear plant
- Contractual flexibility to resell gas limits potential losses of CCGT plant

## Case Nb. 2: Impact of electricity and CO2 price risks – long term fixed price purchase agreement for fossil fuel


NPV (€million/GW) probability distribution  
Electricity price risk - fixed fuel price  
(in  $10^{-4}$  for 100 000 simulations)



- Contractual flexibility to resell gas limits potential downside losses of CCGT plant to lower levels than coal and nuclear plants
  - CCGT 5% percentile reduced from -1817 to -474 €million/GWe
  - Coal 5% percentile reduced from -1432 to -976 €million/GWe
  - Nuclear 5% percentile unchanged at -1511 €million/GWe

# Case Nb. 3: Impact of fuel, electricity and CO2 price risks

NPV (€million/GW) probability distribution  
(in  $10^{-4}$  for 100 000 simulations)




- Contractual flexibility to resell fuel and correlation between power and gas prices limit potential downside losses of CCGT
- ⇒ **For a new entrant, without vertical or horizontal integration, CCGT risk/return profile most interesting**
- ⇒ **CCGT returns are self-hedged through correlation between power and gas prices and power/gas markets arbitrage**




# Marginal cost setting technology faces reduced market risks in liberalised markets

- “*self hedged*” bc. of correlation btw. elec. & gas/CO2 prices
- *self reinforcing externality*: the more investment in CCGT, the more correlated elec&gas prices, the less risky the cash flow of already operating plants.

### Nuclear/Renewable plant



### Gas plant



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# Technology choices and market risks - The case of a large utility with a portfolio of plants

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- Besides a strong balance sheet, an existing and varied portfolio of plants provides a hedge against fuel and CO2 price risks
- **Markowitz Mean Variance Portfolio theory** defines efficient portfolios as the ones which have the smallest attainable portfolio risk for a given level of expected return (or the largest expected return for a given level of risk).
- The **expected return**  $E(r_p)$  of portfolio  $P$  containing  $N$  assets  $i$  [expected return,  $E(r_i)$ , SD,  $\sigma_i$ ] in proportion  $X_i$  is the weighted average of the expected returns of the  $N$  assets:


$$E(r_p) = \sum_{i=1}^N X_i E(r_i)$$

- The portfolio **standard deviation**  $\sigma_p$  is defined by:

$$\sigma_p = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^N X_i^2 \sigma_i^2 + \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N X_i X_j \rho_{ij} \sigma_i \sigma_j}$$


where  $\rho_{ij}$  represents the correlation between the returns  $r_i$  and  $r_j$  of the two assets

# Portfolio Theory efficient frontier



- MVP theory does not prescribe a single optimal portfolio combination, but a **range of efficient choices**.
- Investors will choose a risk-return combination based on their **own preferences and risk aversion**.


# Optimal Portfolios of Nuclear, Coal and CCGT plants with & w/o correlation btw. elec., fuel, & CO2 prices




- Correlation btw. gas, elec.& CO2 prices reduces incentive to diversify away from CCGTs in coal and nuclear

# Optimal generation portfolios for low, medium and high risk aversion


## Low risk aversion



## Medium risk aversion




## High risk aversion



# Optimal Portfolios of Nuclear, Coal and CCGT plants

## – Impact of long term contracts



- Long term fixed price power purchase agreement greatly improve incentives to diversify away from CCGT by investing in coal or nuclear plants

# Outline


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# Which proportion of electricity to lock into long term contracts?



- Capital intensive technologies NPV standard deviation decreases with increasing degree of contract cover
- CCGT plant: trade off as contractual flexibility/spot market sales valuable to arbitrage between gas and power markets

# Conclusions

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- Industrial organisation and long term contracts affect technology choices and fuel mix
- Marginal cost setting technology cash flow “self hedged” by correlation btw. elec/gas/CO2 prices
- Incentives for private investors to diversify their technology mix towards capital intensive low carbon technologies can be improved by vertical integration / long term contracts
- Need for large scale deployment of capital intensive “green technologies” (nuclear, renewables, CC&S) to be taken into account when considering industrial structure and contractual arrangements in liberalised markets

# Analytical Methods for Energy Diversity and Security - Bazilian & Roques (2008)



## Analytical Methods for Energy Diversity & Security

A tribute to  
Shimon Awerbuch

edited by  
Morgan Bazilian & Fabien Roques

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# Thank you for your attention

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## **Références:**

Fabien A. Roques, David M. Newbery, William J. Nuttall (2007). Fuel mix diversification incentives in liberalized electricity markets: A Mean–Variance Portfolio theory approach. *Energy Economics*, Vol 30/4 pp 1831-1849. DOI information: 10.1016/j.eneco.2007.11.008

Also available as working paper EPRG 06/26:

<http://www.electricitypolicy.org.uk/pubs/wp/eprg0626.pdf>

Fabien A. Roques (2008). Technology Choices for New Entrants in Liberalised Markets: The Value of Operating Flexibility and Contractual Arrangements. *Utilities Policy*, in Press.

Also available as Working Paper EPRG 07/26:

<http://www.electricitypolicy.org.uk/pubs/wp/eprg0726.pdf>